In 1901, six Australian states joined together in political and economic union, creating an internal free trade area and adopting a common external tariff. This paper investigates the impact of federation on Australia's internal and international trade flows by studying changes in the "border effect" over this time. This is possible because Australian states reported intra-Australian trade prior to 1901 and for eight years after federation. The results indicate that federation itself produced little change in Australia's trade patterns, but that the border effect increased substantially between 1906 and 1909 when the protectionist Lyne Tariff was imposed.
I. Introduction
In January 1901, the Australian colonies joined together in a political federation, setting the stage for the formation of a customs union later that year. As a result, all duties on intra-Australian trade were abolished and a common external tariff was imposed. The economic impact of this dramatic policy change is an important but unanswered question in Australian economic history.
The economic literature on customs unions suggest that a reduction in tariffs will create trade between partner countries and divert trade away from non-partner countries, with the effect on economic welfare being ambiguous.
1 Although the trade and welfare implications of a customs union can be evaluated with an applied general equilibrium model, the demanding data and parameter requirements of such models pose formidable obstacles to simulating such a policy change for early twentieth century Australia.
However, it is possible to examine changes in Australia's "border effect" for this period, i.e., the difference between its intra-national and international trade, as explored in a large literature started by McCallum (1995) . A unique aspect of Australia's trade statistics during this period is that the Australian states collected data on trade with each other and with foreign countries prior to federation, and continued to do so for nine years after federation. These data give us a rare glimpse of how the country's internal and external trade flows changed as a result of political and economic union. 
II. The Formation of the Australian Customs Union
The Australian states achieved a large measure of tariff autonomy in 1850 with the passage of the Australian Colonies Government Act by the British parliament. From the 1850s until Federation, each of the Australian colonies was an independent political entity that was entitled to determine its own import duties. While British colonial authorities had no role in setting the structure or height of these tariffs, they did require them to be non-discriminatory and uniform across all trading partners. As a result, the duties had to be applied to trade between the Australian colonies. The ban on differential duties meant that the colonies could not give each other, or even Britain, preferential tariff treatment.
This ban on discrimination, in keeping with Britain's strong belief in universal free trade, had the unintended consequence of preventing closer economic ties between the Australian states. The imposition of tariffs on intra-Australian trade even became a source of strife and discontent. Conflict between New South Wales and Victoria over the customs treatment of border trade along the Murray and Darling rivers was particular source of difficulty, but was far from the only problem. Six intercolonial conferences in the decade after 1863 failed to improve matters and "at each the disagreement became more bitter," according to Reitsman (1960, p. 6) . Indeed, in the words of one historian of early Australian tariff policy, "the history of the trade relations of the Australian colonies, it must be confessed, is a sorry record of intercolonial jealousy and strife" (Allin 1918, p. 1) . "Provincialism" is a word often used to describe trade relations during this period.
The desire to eliminate these barriers to internal trade was a principal reason for the movement toward federation in the 1890s. As the first Australian Minister for Trade and Customs said in parliament in 1901: "Years and years we have struggled for Federation.
Why? So that the fiscal barriers which have so long divided the sister States should be removed" (quoted in Reitsman 1960, p. 11) . Of course, the negotiations leading up to the formation of the Commonwealth were difficult; New Zealand dropped out of the discussions, 5 and even the participation of Western Australia was in doubt.
2 Eventually, however, a constitution for the Australian Commonwealth was approved by voters after a second public referendum in June 1899. The United Kingdom agreed to the arrangement in July 1900, and on 1 January 1901, the six states of Australia united under the federal constitution.
Under the constitution, the six states lost their tariff autonomy and all power to regulate foreign commerce shifted to the federal government. Yet commerce between the Australia states did not become free of duty until a common external tariff had been settled upon. The framers of the constitution did not attempt to determine the tariff, but left this to be decided by the first Australian parliament. The constitution provided that "uniform duties of customs shall be imposed within two years after the establishment of the Commonwealth," but it did not take that long. The first common tariff was implemented on 8 October 1901. As of that date, all duties on commerce between the Australian states were abolished. A special constitutional provision permitted Western
Australia to continue to impose duties on goods from other states for five years, with the duties declining by one fifth each year.
III. Federation and Australia's Trade Flows
At the time of federation, the Australian states were highly integrated economies, with few formal barriers to trade except the tariff. As Forster (1975) The impact of the customs union formation in 1901 could be expected to vary by state, depending upon the height of its pre-federation tariffs. The tariff codes of each colony were similar in the 1850s, but increasingly diverged after the 1860s (Patterson 1968) . New South Wales maintained a free trade policy, eschewing duties on imported manufactured goods and applying tariffs almost exclusively on "narcotics and stimulants" (tobacco and alcohol) for revenue purposes. Victoria adopted a more protectionist policy in levying higher duties on imports of manufactured goods to assist local industry. The other colonies chose to be somewhere in the middle of this spectrum, with Western Australia tending more toward the free-trade end and Tasmania imposing perhaps even higher barriers than Victoria.
However, it is difficult to assess the magnitude of these pre-federation barriers.
expanding British market." Quoted in McLean (1995, p. 175) . 3 As Pincus (1995, p. 58) put it: "The new central government was given power over currency, coinage and legal tender; over banking, insurance, quarantine, corporations, bankruptcy, copyrights, weights and measures, posts and telegraph and the like; that is, over the ways in which the colonies had imposed non-tariff barriers on intercolonial trade." Other non-tariff barriers, such as different railway gauges, would take decades Quantifying the impact of non-tariff barriers is inherently problematic, and even determining the height of pre-and post-federation tariffs is not a straightforward exercise. 4 While the shortcomings of the tariff revenue as a percent of import value are well known, it may be the best available measure of trade policy. As Rodriguez and Rodrik (2001, p. 316) note, "It is common to assert . . . that simple trade-weighted tariff averages or nontariff coverage ratios -which we believe to be the most direct indicators of trade restrictions -are misleading indicators of the stance of trade policy. Yet we know of no papers that document the existence of serious biases in these direct indicators, much less establish that an alternative indicator performs better (in the relevant sense of calibrating the restrictiveness of trade regimes). An examination of simple averages of taxes on imports and exports and NTB coverage ratios leaves us with the impression that these measures in fact do a decent job of rank-ordering countries according to the restrictiveness of their trade regimes." percent reflects the revenue raised from specific duties on "intoxicants and narcotics" -ale and beer, spirits and wine, opium and tobacco. (Domestic excise taxes were also levied on domestic production of tobacco and alcohol goods, so the tariff was essentially the international extension of those domestic excises.) Tariffs on other merchandise were only about one percent of import value. By contrast, Victoria imposed significant duties on imported manufactured goods and its tariff on merchandise other than narcotics and stimulants was nearly 20 percent. Tasmania allowed very few goods to enter the state free of duty, and average tariffs on merchandise exceeded 20 percent.
Queensland, South Australia, and Western Australia had tariff rates somewhere in between the New South Wales and Victoria/Tasmania extremes.
However, the average tariff measures in Table 1 could be misleading indicators of the taxes applied to the goods that comprised most of intra-Australia trade. While
Australia's overseas imports consisted largely of textiles and other manufactured goods from Britain, Australia's inter-state commerce consisted more of food, drink, metals, and agricultural products. The tariff codes for these products were a complex array of specific duties and domestic excises that make it extremely difficult to determine the differential impact of tariffs on intra-versus inter-national trade.
What about the level of the first common external tariff? Forster (1977) suggests that the political compromise reached by the states in parliament was not between free trade and existing protection, but between existing protection and further protection. In his view, the first federal tariff was substantially closer to Victoria's than to New South Wales's. Forster (1977) concludes that "for the colonies as a whole the tariff was raised considerably." One reason for the increase in the average external tariff is that two levels of government now had to be funded -the states and the Commonwealth. A key part of the negotiation leading to federation concerned the division of customs revenues among the states. The transitional arrangement required the federal government to return to the states three-fourths of all customs and excise revenue for ten years after federation. Thus, the first parliament had a stake in raising a significant amount of tariff revenue because it only got to keep one quarter of the proceeds. (Butlin 1977, p. 81) . Because of specific duties, import price fluctuations also account for much of the change in the average U.S. tariff over time; see Irwin (1998) . (1) log (X it + X jt ) = α + β 1 log (y i ) + β 2 log (y j ) + β 3 log (
where X ij is exports from region i to region j, y i and y j are the economic size (measured by GDP) of regions i and j, DIS ij is the distance between regions i and j, and D ij is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if regions i and j belong to the same country Because of asymmetries created by differences in country size, there is not one exclusive measure of the border effect. For example, a given border effect will be large when measured from the standpoint of a small country, but small when measured from the standpoint of a large country.
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) develop a specification to estimate border
effects that accounts for this difference and is more closely tied to economic theory.
The appropriate specification (constraining the coefficients on GDP to equal one) is:
(2) log (X ij /y i y j ) = ρ(1 -σ) log (DIS ij ) + (1 -σ) τ ij + log (P i ) σ -1 + log (P j )
where F is the elasticity of substitution in consumption between all goods, J is the trade cost or implicit tax barrier to trade between countries, and the P's are price indicies ("multilateral resistance terms") that reflect, among other things, transport costs.
Because the P's are not readily calculated, country fixed-effects have been proposed as an alternative estimation strategy that leads to consistent (but less efficient) results. To reduce the upward bias in the measure of the border effect, the dummy variable is switched to indicate international trade and not intranational trade. As a result, their estimating equation is:
where the *'s are indicator variables for state i and region j. The results from the Anderson and van Wincoop specification in equation (3) cannot be directly compared to those from the McCallum specification in equation (1).
However, the two can be compared if the McCallum regression is recast by constraining the coefficients on GDP to equal one such that:
This equation will be estimated along with equation (3) A recurring question about these data is the extent to which they are compromised by goods in transit between these states but ultimately destined for other countries. Both New South Wales (Sydney) and Victoria (Melbourne) received goods from other states in Australia that were to be shipped to the United Kingdom or other overseas destinations. Fortunately, the export data for New South Wales, Victoria, and South Australia explicitly separate out locally produced goods from those of other Australian state whose goods were in transit to other destinations. In addition, Tasmania presented data both on exports and exports by country of final destination (e.g., exports to NSW are large, but many were ultimately going to the United Kingdom).
The main concern is for data from Queensland and Western Australia, as sources for France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, China, Japan, Java (Indonesia), Mexico, Peru, and the United States. For Australia, real GDP is also taken from Maddison (2003) and apportioned to the various states based on the GDP shares in Cashin (1995) . Distance is sea shipping distance from http://www.distances.com.
Equations (4) However, this implicit price barrier is highly sensitive to the assumed elasticity of substitution. With σ = 4, for example, the implicit tax rises to 68 percent, and if σ = 3, then the tax is about 117 percent. We lack any solid information on the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods for this period; it could be that Australian products were quite different from foreign (imported) goods, making for a low elasticity of substitution and a higher implicit tax.
We cannot use the estimate of ( to determine how much more trade there was within Australia than across the border, but its exponential is equal to the geometric mean of the border's impact on intranational trade relative to international trade for each country, i.e., the average border effect for Australia and rest of the world (Feenstra 2002 (Feenstra , 2004 . In this case, since e 1.55 = 4.7, the average effect of the border is to raise intranational by a factor of 4.7 above international trade. This clearly indicates that there was a significant border effect prior to federation.
The results for 1900 are more noteworthy than those for 1890 because they What explains the fact that internal free trade as a result of federation apparently brought about no significant changes in Australia's trade flows? One possibility is that tariff barriers were not a serious impediment to intra-Australian trade, while non-tariff barriers (such as different railway gauges) were not immediately affected by federation.
Another possibility is that the high degree of capital and labor mobility between Australian states in certain industries effectively overcame any significant trade barriers and these factor flows substituted for trade flows even after the internal tariff was reduced (Mundell 1957 Figure 1 . Thus, it appears that a much greater degree of trade protection was adopted not as a result of federation, but as a result of legislation adopted shortly thereafter.
9
The other significant change in the 1907 tariff was the introduction of tariff preferences for the British Commonwealth. These preferences appear to have the slight effect of halting the decline in intra-Commonwealth trade that was evident up to this point. These effects are all summarized in Table 3 , which shows how different the year 9 See Sullivan (1997) for a detailed study of Australia's tariff politics in the first decade of federation. 
